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ON THE CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF 
CONSTITUTIONS 
John E. Finn* 
 
SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE (UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
2014). PP. 176. HARDCOVER $ 29.95. 
 
GEORGE THOMAS, CONSTITUTING THE AMERICAN MIND: THE FOUNDERS AND 
THE IDEA OF A NATIONAL UNIVERSITY (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
2014). PP. 252. HARDCOVER $ 95.00. 
Most constitutions have a shelf-life.1 This proposition may not seem immediately 
obvious, especially in an era when nearly every state mouths some measure of fidelity to 
constitutionalism writ large and where there are few, if any, other credible alternatives for 
organizing and legitimating state power. But the triumph of global constitutionalism2 may 
eclipse the reality that most constitutions proper have fairly short and often ignoble 
lifespans.3 Indeed, constitutions fail with depressing regularity.4 
If we limit our experience to the American Constitution, however, we might con-
clude that constitutional government is a reasonably stable and successful affair, especially 
if we measure “success” by time. I put the word success in the preceding sentence in scare 
quotes to signal my reservations about whether we should measure success temporally. 
Once we begin to think closely about what constitutional success means and how we might 
measure it, it becomes less obvious that the American Constitution is in fact a success. We 
might instead ask (again, for the question of the Constitution’s failure is a recurrent theme 
                                                          
* Professor of Government, Wesleyan University. 
 1. Not all constitutions admit this, as should be clear from the formal title of “The Articles of Confederation 
and Perpetual Union.” For discussions of perpetuity in constitutional law, see JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN 
CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 4-7 (1991); see also Kenneth M. Stampp, The Concept of 
Perpetual Union, 55 J. AM. HIST. 5 (1978). 
 2. See C. NEAL TATE & TORBJORN VALLINDER, THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1995); 
STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013). 
 3. See generally WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING A 
JUST POLITICAL ORDER 15-16 (2007), for a distinction between “consitutionism” and “constitutionalism.” 
 4. ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 
(2009). 
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in any honest account of American constitutional history) if the Constitution has failed. 
The problem of constitutional failure is a question of deep practical import, not only 
because failure is the probable result of every effort at constitutional governance, but also 
because a genuinely robust constitutional order is one that attends to its imperfections.5 It 
is heartening to see a renewed scholarly interest in constitutional failure, at least as meas-
ured by the appearance of several important new works on the subject.6 The matter of the 
Constitution’s success or failure has elicited a small but important body of academic liter-
ature in the past decade or so, a literature that takes seriously the idea that the United States 
is in a significant state of constitutional dysfunction.7 This work, however, is not simply a 
reread of the classics.8 The best of it, and Sotirios Barber’s Constitutional Failure9 is de-
servedly on that list, significantly advances our understanding of constitutional govern-
ment. In particular, Barber reminds us that we cannot think about constitutional failure 
meaningfully without asking also what we mean by its correlate—the idea of constitutional 
success.10 In asking that question, Barber both insists and demonstrates, we return consti-
tutional theory to its origins in the founding and simultaneously highlight its contemporary 
urgency. 
George Thomas’s new book is an equally significant, if very different, take on the 
question of constitutional failure. The Founders and the Idea of a National University: 
Constituting the American Mind11 is ostensibly a welcomed and detailed study of the sev-
eral proposals during the founding and well into the nineteenth century to establish a na-
tional university. Approached in the narrowest of possible terms, Thomas’s book would 
be a fascinating inquiry into an important, but long neglected, episode of constitutional 
failure, or of the failure on the part of the Founders to establish an institution many of them 
were convinced was an important part of establishing a successful constitutional order. 
                                                          
 5. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011). 
 6. See, e.g., JEFFREY K. TULIS & STEPHEN MACEDO, THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2010); 
 7. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 
(2013); BALKIN, supra note 5; JAMES FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL 
READINGS AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS (2015); MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 
(2012); Louis Michael Seidman, Let’s Give Up on the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2012, http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/12/31/opinion/lets-give-up-on-the-constitution.html?_r=0. 
 8. See CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN 
DEMOCRACIES (1948); CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy trans., 
1988); CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., 2004); MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN 
THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE (1998). For an especially illuminating study 
of Schmitt, see ELLEN KENNEDY, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE: CARL SCHMITT IN WEIMAR (2004); LOUIS 
MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2013). The question of how and why constitutions 
fail has a long and noble history in constitutional theory. In the twentieth century, for example, and ironically 
just before the global triumph of constitutionalism, an entire generation of public law scholars addressed consti-
tutional failure as a political problem of the highest order intellectual order and of the most urgent political 
necessity. Their work—the work of folks like Schmitt, Lowenstein, Friedrich, and Rossiter—has influenced gen-
erations of constitutional theorists, mostly for the good, but also sometimes in pernicious ways. For an overview, 
see FINN, supra note 1. 
 9. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE (2014); MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: 
AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE (1998). 
 10. BARBER, supra note 9, at 26. 
 11. GEORGE THOMAS, THE FOUNDERS AND THE IDEA OF A NATIONAL UNIVERSITY: CONSTITUTING THE 
AMERICAN MIND (2014). 
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But as Thomas convincingly demonstrates, an inquiry into this specific failure is equally 
an inquiry into the prerequisites of constitutional success and failure more broadly. Like 
Barber, Thomas asks us to think capaciously about what successful constitutional mainte-
nance requires, and of whom. 
Put another way, these two important books about constitutional failure turn out to 
be two important books about constitutional care and maintenance. They are inquiries into 
the possibilities and prerequisites of constitutional success, inquiries into the conditions 
that make it possible for constitutional orders to succeed or to fail. Moreover, both Barber 
and Thomas emphasize a particular and too often overlooked determinant of constitutional 
success and failure: the capacity of such orders to constitute citizens and cultures, as well 
as institutions, calibrated to a vigorous constitutional politics. 
I. MINDING THE CONSTITUTION 
As Thomas recounts, proposals to establish a national university both predated the 
Constitution of 1787 and continued to surface long after the Constitution’s formal ratifi-
cation. Among the earliest was the one issued by Benjamin Rush in his “Address” in The 
American Museum in January 1787. Rush urged the Continental Congress to establish a 
“federal university . . . to conform the principles, morals, and manners of our citizens to 
our republican forms of government.”12 Rush saw the need for republican education as a 
continuation of the Revolution itself, noting “nothing but the first act of the great drama is 
closed. It remains yet to establish and perfect our new forms of government.”13 For Rush, 
completing the revolution to republican government required new citizens, as well as new 
institutions. Behind this idea, Thomas shows, is an equally important realization: consti-
tutional orders neither begin nor end with the creation of a constitutional document. “Pro-
ponents of a national university saw the institutions they were creating as furthering revo-
lutionary and constitutional principles. This was a sort of nation building, but building on 
a distinctly political foundation.”14 One of the most significant lessons constitutionalists 
should draw from Thomas’s close history is that a founding cannot be confined to a single 
discrete and bounded moment in time; a founding is performative in character. It must be 
reenacted as each new generation of citizens comes to the age of constitutional maturity. 
Rush was more than a solitary voice in the wind. As Thomas details, the call for a 
national university dedicated to a curriculum grounded in the principles and precepts of 
republican government and new constitutional ideas—a form of nation building15—was 
echoed by several of the Founders, including, notably, Noah Webster, Samuel Blodget, 
Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and President George Washington. 
Washington’s support in particular ran deep. He was willing, for example, to endow such 
a university in the District of Columbia with his shares in the Potomac River Company, 
and included a formal proposal in his message to Congress on December 7, 1796, noting 
that a national university would contribute to “our prosperity and reputation,” as well as 
                                                          
 12. Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 13. Benjamin Rush, Address to the People of the United States at the American Museum (Jan. 1787). 
 14. THOMAS, supra note 11, at 14. 
 15. Id. at 24. 
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help to cement the bonds of Union: “The more homogeneous our Citizens can be made, 
the greater will be our prospect of permanent Union; and a primary object of such a Na-
tional Institution should be the education of our Youth in the science of Government.”16 
Washington repeated the call throughout his presidency, including in his last message to 
Congress. 
Although calls for a national university were never realized, Thomas convincingly 
shows that the debates had a profound impact on the development of university curricula, 
and indeed, on the idea of the university itself in American public life. The founding era 
was a rich one for educational invention, with no fewer than nineteen colleges founded 
between 1782 and 1802.17 Changing too were ideas about the purposes and character of 
university education. One prominent example of this change, as Thomas shows in Chapter 
4, was the transition from private (though heavily funded with public money) sectarian 
education in places like Harvard, Yale, and William and Mary, to a secular curriculum that 
would help to effect “a revolution of the mind,” which in turn “would clear the way” to a 
“republican and commercial society.”18 The development of secular curricula also helped 
to establish the “separation of the ‘civic’ from the ‘theological’ and the ‘public’ from the 
‘private,’”19 and in so doing helped to map education “to replicate the general outlines of 
the constitution and ‘modern life.’”20 
If, as Thomas shows, the ultimate purpose of a national university was to create a 
new kind of citizen, appropriate to a new constitutional politics, then such a citizen had to 
be possessed of a certain mind, of a character and disposition suited to advance the consti-
tutional project. This is a critical point in Thomas’s work: the Founders understood that 
the effort to constitute a new politics required new citizens as well as new institutions, and 
that both would have to be made rather than assumed. As a consequence, proposals to 
establish a national university were part of an effort to craft institutions sufficient to the 
task of creating a new American mind or of creating citizens equal to the task of sustaining 
a new political community founded on certain elemental constitutional precepts and val-
ues. Consider, for example, a quote by Rush: “Let our pupil be taught that he does not 
belong to himself, but that he is public property.”21 This understanding of both the purpose 
and the content of civic education, Thomas admits, seems difficult to reconcile with some 
prominent contemporary understandings about the purposes and proper reach of the liberal 
state. Implicit in this conception of civic education are understandings about state and so-
ciety that many contemporary liberal theorists might find objectionable or illiberal, more 
reminiscent of Rousseau (and especially of the Rousseau writing in The Government of 
                                                          
 16. Id. at 32. 
 17. FREDERICK RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY: A HISTORY 35 (1990). 
 18. THOMAS, supra note 11, at 16, 124-58. 
 19. Id. at 16. 
 20. Id. 
 21. BENJAMIN RUSH, Thoughts Upon the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic (1798), in THE SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN RUSH 87, 90 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1976). 
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 51 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol51/iss2/8
FINN_3.13.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2016  11:01 PM 
2016] ON THE CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF CONSTITUTIONS  305 
Poland22) than of Rawls.23 Thomas’s discussion of this in Chapter 6, “The Civic Dimen-
sions of American Constitutionalism,” is especially illuminating. Thomas notes that much 
of contemporary debate about liberal democracy and the role of a liberal education is 
“largely dominated by variations on Michael Sandel’s plea for ‘civic republicanism,’ on 
one side, and John Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ on the other. And yet neither understand-
ing captures, nor encompasses, the subtleties of the thinking behind the national univer-
sity.”24 Thomas argues that a more nuanced understanding of civic education, as dedicated 
to the project of constitutional attachment and the teaching of civic principles, should lead 
us away from a “misguided quest” for liberal neutrality and toward an understanding of 
constitutional development itself as educative and transformative in nature.25 Building on 
a concept borrowed from German constitutionalists and the emergency theorists of the 
mid-twentieth century, Thomas sees the work of civic education as directed to the devel-
opment of constitutional patriotism, or an education into the Constitution’s principles and 
into “values that might be said to transcend the particular polity.”26 
So precisely what kinds of citizens did the proponents of a national university seek 
to create and to educate? We might describe them as citizens with a mind to constitutional 
life or as citizens possessed of two characteristics essential to the constitutional project. 
The first characteristic is a mind for politics, equipped with the sort of knowledge and 
sentiments appropriate to civic life and engagement under the Constitution. Here, 
Thomas’s discussion of proposed curricula in the national university, and in the nation’s 
elite universities and colleges, is particularly revealing. The ultimate purpose was to in-
struct citizens in what it means to pursue a constitutional way of life, “the body of beliefs, 
principles, and attitudes toward human life that have dominated western civilization since 
the seventeenth century arguably through our own time.”27 The second characteristic of 
citizens educated in a constitutional way of life is a disposition to tend to political life as 
an object of care and solicitude. (Here, Thomas utilizes the work of Sheldon Wolin.)28 
Why should we care about the Founders’ failure to establish a national university? 
Thomas’s detailed history of these efforts is valuable in its own right, but the real contri-
bution Thomas makes is to show how conversations about such an institution were neces-
sarily conversations about how to create and sustain a constitutional way of life. As Rogers 
Smith notes, “[t]he reasons why many Founders favored a national university, and the 
reasons why many others resisted one, reveal profound tensions in American hearts over 
nationalism and localism, reason and religion, and democracy and wisdom.”29 Debates 
                                                          
 22. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND (Willmoore Kendall trans., 1985). 
 23. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2005). 
 24. THOMAS, supra note 11, at 195. 
 25. Id. at 192-223. For two versions of this sort of argument, see JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, 
ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013) and STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL 
VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990). 
 26. THOMAS, supra note 11, at 212. 
 27. Thomas is careful to note that these substantive principles “are themselves deeply contested.” Id. at 11. 
 28. For a general discussion of the concept of tending, see SHELDON S. WOLIN, THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST: 
ESSAYS ON THE STATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 82-101 (1989); see also JOHN E. FINN, PEOPLING THE 
CONSTITUTION 25-27 (2014). 
 29. Rogers Smith makes this point in his comments on the back flap. 
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about the wisdom and necessity of a national university, as Washington’s reference to a 
homogeneous people implies (as well as debates about its constitutionality), went to the 
heart of our emerging constitutional identity. Indeed, “[h]ow to bring the people together, 
and on what basis,” was not only “a central constitutional question” at the founding, but it 
also remains one today.30 It remains a point of tension not because calls for a national 
university were never realized (it seems difficult to believe now that a national university 
could have overcome these fundamental fissures), but rather because such tensions are a 
part of our collective constitutional identity. 
So these are recurrent tensions in our constitutional life: if a national university is 
unimaginable in our time, the sense that civic education might remain a way to navigate 
and manage such tensions nevertheless remains a significant part of constitutional thinking 
for many constitutional theorists.31  
What, then, should we make of the persistent failure of long-standing and oft-re-
peated efforts to establish a national university, an effort supported by an impressive roster 
of constitutional luminaries? One way to get at this question is to imagine what a success-
ful national university might have meant for our constitutional life. Its benefits might have 
included a citizenry well educated in the meaning and value of the norms and precepts that 
characterize a commitment to a constitutional way of life and by extension a richer, more 
robust, and perhaps even a more secure (and secular) constitutional order, one whose le-
gitimacy and perdurability would be grounded more in reason and less in idolatry. “Cer-
tainly, surveying contemporary politics, we would benefit tremendously from . . . a knowl-
edgeable and more civil leadership.”32 Perhaps the more interesting question, however, is, 
as Thomas puts it: “[W]hat might we have lost with a national university?”33 Thomas 
suggests we might have lost the great diversity of private and public institutions of educa-
tion that has contributed so much to American life.34 But we might push the question 
further—maybe a national university was just a bad idea and its loss was no constitutional 
failure at all? Even if a national university might have helped to ground “constitutional 
principles in the civic sphere,”35 it seems difficult to imagine that a national university 
could have overcome or would have smoothed out the persistent cleavages that continue 
to dominate American political life, though of course its critics feared it would.36 Indeed, 
in creating a necessarily small, but likely influential cadre of citizen-graduates, one cannot 
help but wonder if a national university would not have exacerbated such tensions and in 
so doing, made constitutional governance even more remote from most of its citizens. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ATTITUDES 
Barber’s book on constitutional failure begins with a familiar complaint: American 
                                                          
 30. THOMAS, supra note 11, at 15. 
 31. See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 25; MACEDO, supra note 25; FINN, supra note 28. 
 32. THOMAS, supra note 11, at 227. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 212; see, e.g., FINN, supra note 28; ELIZABETH BEAUMONT, THE CIVIC CONSTITUTION: CIVIC 
VISIONS AND STRUGGLES IN THE PATH TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2014). 
 36. THOMAS, supra note 11, at 15. 
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political life, he observes, is deeply and fundamentally dysfunctional.37 Its politics is 
sickly, as evidenced in part by deep ideological division, “religious and free-market zeal-
otry, and academic value-neutrality.”38 A sick politics (and Barber is clear that our politics 
is sickly, though the point is assumed rather than argued) is “a sure sign” of constitutional 
trouble as well.39 
Barber’s contribution to the burgeoning literature on constitutional failure is signif-
icant: Barber posits that constitutional failure is ultimately attitudinal.40 In reaching this 
conclusion, Barber highlights the incompleteness of Madison’s institutionalism as a way 
of securing the Constitution.41 As does Thomas, in a different way. In arguing that insti-
tution building in the new republic extended to educational institutions, Thomas expands 
our understanding of what constitutional institutions are as well as why they are necessary. 
As Barber argues, most readings of Madison see his elaborate institutionalism, with its 
reliance on separation of powers and checks and balances, as premised on the belief that 
constitutional architecture can and should compensate for our lack of civic virtue.42 Barber 
rejects the idea that these constitutional contrivances, or constitutional engineering gener-
ally, are enough to secure a vibrant and successful constitutional order.43 Indeed, in Bar-
ber’s view, the conceit that we can compensate for the “defect of better motives “through 
institutional design was bound to fail, precisely because it assumed that constitutional gov-
ernment could survive without creating citizens (and their representatives) with a mind to 
constitutional life.44 Indeed, both Barber and Thomas show how such proposals, if not a 
major part of the Federalist Papers proper, were nonetheless widely shared by Federalists 
and by Madison himself.45 
For Barber, therefore, inquiries into constitutional failure should be centered not on 
the durability of constitutional institutions or on our (lack of) respect for rights, but rather 
should examine constitutional ends and the extent to which we have or have not realized 
those ends.46 This is consistent with Barber’s well-known argument for a welfarist reading 
of the Constitution,47 or the argument that “the Constitution envisions more than a gov-
ernment that proceeds fairly and respects rights. It envisions what its Preamble says it 
envisions: a good state of society, good things like national security . . . and a prosperous 
people.”48 Barber describes this as a “preambular test.”49 So a welfarist conception of 
                                                          
 37. BARBER, supra note 9, at 27. 
 38. Id. at 141-42. 
 39. Id. at 27.  
 40. Id. at 79-83. 
 41. Id. at 26. 
 42. BARBER, supra note 9, at 98-100. 
 43. Id. at 45. 
 44. Id. at 100 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). I 
should note here that this description of Madison’s design may understate those aspects of Madisonian political 
thought that did envision some role for the cultivation of constitutional virtue. 
 45. Id. at 98-99, 102-05. 
 46. Id. at 26-29. 
 47. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003). 
 48. BARBER, supra note 9, at 26. 
 49. Id. at 53. 
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constitutional success “turns out to be the reasonable pursuit of constitutional ends—rea-
sonable debate about what they mean in practice and how to realize them.”50 In Chapter 2 
of Constitutional Failure, Barber describes these ends in more detail:  
 
They initially appear to be economic growth, economic fairness, and 
other features of “the Large Commercial Republic” that Martin Dia-
mond derived from The Federalist. . . . Yet [this] proves to be no more 
than a conception of the good life for Americans, and conceptions of 
ends like the common defense and the general welfare can be wrong, 
especially as circumstances change.51  
 
A preambular test of constitutional success, Barber posits, must include “reasonable 
progress toward reasonable understandings of constitutional ends, good things like secu-
rity, prosperity, and fairness.”52 These ends are aspirational in character—we cannot fully 
realize them, but we can make reasonable and good faith efforts to pursue them.53 Barber 
concedes that the pursuit and the achievement of such ends is not an uncomplicated mat-
ter.54 Sometimes one or another of these ends exists in tension with others, to say nothing 
about how reasonable persons might disagree about what they mean and how—and per-
haps even if—they should be realized. 
Readers familiar with Barber’s work will anticipate where this is headed: reasonable 
debate about the nature and realization of constitutional ends both anticipates and requires 
what Barber calls “secular public reasonableness” and “a disposition to account for one’s 
actions to others in ways that others can understand and live with.”55 Such a disposition is 
both a civic virtue and a central feature of a robust constitutional order.56 Among the most 
interesting and important of Barber’s claims is that a healthy constitutional order should 
yield “a healthy politics”—and inversely, that a sick or failed politics is a sign of constitu-
tional failure.57 One wonders about the causal imprecision in this claim. Surely some 
forms of political disorder can and should be traced to constitutional sources, but on re-
flection this turns out to be more difficult than first appears. As James Fleming has ob-
served, all sorts of failures might be “attributable to the Constitution in the sense that they 
are made more likely by our constitutional design.”58 “Collapsing them all under the rubric 
of constitutional failure is likely to mislead us as to the reasons why states have failed, and 
just as likely to misdirect our efforts to forestall or remedy failure.”59 What makes consti-
tutional failure “constitutional” in character? 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 27. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 51. 
 53. BARBER, supra note 9, at 57. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 81, 27. 
 56. Id. at 27, 77-78, 81. 
 57. Id. at 27. 
 58. James E. Fleming, Towards a More Democratic Congress, 89 B.U.L. REV. 629, 632 n.16 (2009). 
 59. Ellen Kennedy made this point strongly in her excellent study of constitutional failure in the Weimar 
Republic. See KENNEDY, supra note 8. 
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Constitutional failure is “mostly a matter of public and elite attitudes” about the 
meaning and importance of constitutional ends.60 A definition of constitutional success as 
tied to a secular public order and informed by our commitment to preambular ends has 
great significance for how we define constitutional failure. It means that neither constitu-
tional success nor constitutional failure can be measured by the durability of constitutional 
institutions. Indeed, the persistence of such institutions, absent a commitment to constitu-
tional ends by engaged and civically committed citizens, may obscure a larger failure—
similar to what I have called constitutional rot, where considerations of legality obscure 
questions of constitutionality and where “We the people” are unwilling or unable to take 
up such questions as our own.61 Rather, failure occurs when there is no meaningful pro-
spect for constitutional reform. For Barber, then, the most visible sign of constitutional 
failure in the United States is our collective inability to take the prospect of constitutional 
reform seriously. Indeed, constitutional failure is not really about the text because “[t]he 
Constitution itself can’t succeed or fail, for failure and success are properties of actions 
and cognate phenomena, like activities and practices . . . Constitutional failure is thus the 
failure of a culture. And constitutional reform must therefore be nothing short of cultural 
reform.”62 
III. WHERE NOW? 
If, as both Barber and Thomas argue, constitutional success requires citizens with a 
suitably constitutional mindset, then there remain significant questions for constitutional 
theorists to take up. Two of the most significant are also the most obvious. First, what sorts 
of attitudes cement the constitutional order and what sorts subvert it? It is all well and good 
to note that constitutional failure is ultimately attitudinal, but what attitudes ought we to 
favor and which ones ought we to abjure? And second, how do we develop such attitudes? 
In Barber’s words, “constitutional survival . . . depends on attitudes like patriotism, trust, 
and magnanimity.”63 Thinking in this way, as Thomas shows, forces us to (re)think what 
kinds of institutions the process of constitution making requires. It also asks us to expand 
our understanding of constitutional institutions to include, as the Founders did, the institu-
tions in and of civil society, where one might plausibly think (as did Madison, to a degree 
many of us overlook) that civic virtues are nurtured and cultivated. Here, both Barber and 
Thomas identify the failure of the Founders to create a national university as a significant 
failure of constitution building. There is no possibility now of a national university (and 
that might be a good thing), but civic education remains an important mechanism for cul-
tivating the civic virtues necessary to sustain the Constitution. What sort of civic education 
best supports the Constitution? 
Thomas makes an important contribution here in distinguishing between an educa-
                                                          
 60. BARBER, supra note 9, at 79, 106-08 (“Mostly,” Barber writes, but not entirely. Barber also attaches some 
weight to structural rules, especially to Article 5.). 
 61. FINN, supra note 28, at 31-32. 
 62. BARBER, supra note 9, at xvii. 
 63. Id. at 2. 
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tion geared to Constitution worship and veneration, which both Barber and Thomas con-
demn, and one dedicated to what Thomas calls “constitutional patriotism.”64 Constitu-
tional patriotism “is not, then, an uncritical patriotism, but neither is it neutral with regard 
to the constitutional order.”65 Its curriculum includes a “commitment to a political creed” 
and a commitment to “regime defining characteristics,” including “equality, liberty, gov-
ernment under law, tolerance, and other such constitutional values.”66 Thomas’s distinc-
tion between a civic education in the principles of constitutional patriotism and constitu-
tional cheerleading rejects as unsuitable to a vibrant constitutional culture the sort of 
Constitution worship and veneration that Barber also decries. It assumes, put another way, 
that a successful constitutional order must include what Barber describes as “reasonable 
public debate” about constitutional (preambular) ends. 
Barber agrees that Constitution worship undermines the civic virtues necessary to 
sustain a healthy constitutional order. Veneration ill-suits constitutional maintenance for 
several reasons. First, it obscures the possibility of constitutional failure and diminishes, 
as a consequence, the prospects for meaningful constitutional reform. Barber’s arguments 
here recall the complaints of other well-known critics of Constitution worship, including 
the prominent works of Levinson, Balkin, and several other scholars.67 Moreover, Consti-
tution worship subverts the larger constitutional project by rendering improbable if not 
impossible the development of citizens who can engage in reasonable public discussion 
about preambular ends. Constitution worship thus obscures any real possibility of public 
discussion of what preambular ends demand of us or whether we are making reasonable 
progress toward achieving them. 
One of the more interesting subtleties of Barber’s argument is his distinction be-
tween venerating the Constitution and venerating the Founders/founding itself. The latter 
we should indeed venerate, but “for the virtues it represents, not for the constitution it 
produced.”68 At this point Barber’s argument slides uneasily into a discussion of Article 
5 and the principle of amendability, which Barber considers key. Why? We should vener-
ate the Founders, he argues, not for what they produced (this Constitution), but rather for 
what they imagined themselves to be demonstrating, “namely, humanity’s capacity for 
‘establishing good government from reflection and choice.’”69 This is why the Constitu-
tion’s amendability is key. In venerating what the Founders did, instead of what they pro-
duced, we can imagine ourselves as engaged in the same constitutional project, and being 
so engaged demands of us a commitment to certain civic or constitutional virtues, among 
them public reasonableness, or the capacity for “reflection and choice.”70 
                                                          
 64. THOMAS, supra note 11, at 195. 
 65. Id. at 230. 
 66. Id. at 229-30. 
 67. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF 
GOVERNANCE (2012); JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD (2011); Jeremy D. Bailey, Should We Venerate That Which We Cannot Love? James Madison on Con-
stitutional Imperfection, 65 POL. RES. Q. 732 (2012); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 68.  BARBER, supra note 9, at 20. 
 69.  Id. at 19. 
 70. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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Some of us may think that a vision of civic education committed to constitutional 
patriotism goes too far in an ostensibly liberal republic or that it violates liberal notions of 
political community.71 Others may think the line between civic education and Constitution 
worship is too dim or too fuzzy—and that the former will inevitably become the latter. 
Indeed, what Barber envisions seems far removed from the reality of contemporary Con-
stitution worship, which makes none of the finely grained distinctions between the Found-
ers and the Constitution that Barber defends. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Is constitutional failure in the United States imminent or irreversible? Barber equiv-
ocates, writing in several places that our sickly politics is a sure sign of constitutional 
decay and noting that our pronounced inclinations to Constitution worship inhibit any pro-
spect of meaningful constitutional reform. He states “what little hope remains depends 
almost entirely on chance.”72 “As a practical matter,” he concludes, “we’re stuck with 
what we’ve got.”73 Barber repeats the message in his last chapter, but writes too that some 
measure of optimism might be located in the works of constitutional scholars who seek to 
revive our constitutional capacity. As Barber phrases the problem, “[t]he nation’s apparent 
loss of constitutionalist capacity confronts the American legal academy with a di-
lemma. . . . What can constitutional scholars responsibly do or say when there’s nothing 
to do or say that isn’t harmful to the country in some way?”74 Barber’s answer is that 
“[c]onstitutional scholars who would contribute to the survival of American constitution-
alism must quit the business of celebrating the unworkable. They must come to see them-
selves as the American Founders saw themselves: less as constitutionists than as constitu-
tionalists.”75 This is the right prescription, but as Thomas intimates, it is better addressed 
to citizens than to scholars. 
Every constitution imagines a certain kind of citizenry into being—a citizenry made 
in its own image and best-suited to advance its vision of a constitutional way of life. Like-
wise, in a constitutional state, every call for civic education rests, sometimes explicitly but 
more often only implicitly, on an assessment of the people’s capacity for self-governance. 
If we think the people are not and cannot be made to be reliable stewards of constitutional 
values, then we must educate citizens to think about the Constitution in a particular sort of 
way—as an object of veneration. In my judgment, Barber’s despondency rests on an as-
sessment of our civic life that is insufficiently attuned to the possibilities for civic engage-
ment in American politics and to how the institutions of state can develop and cultivate 
them. As I have written elsewhere, reinvigorating civic constitutionalism in the United 
States is more a matter of restoration and renewal than of constitutional invention.76 But 
Barber, like Thomas, is right to show us how much that project depends on our willingness 
to think about what the Constitution means and less about how it shines. 
                                                          
 71. Both Thomas and Barber reject this understanding of liberalism. 
 72. BARBER, supra note 9, at 25. 
 73. Id. at xvi-xvii. 
 74. Id. at 113-14. 
 75. Id. at 144. 
 76. FINN, supra note 28, at 222-24. 
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Ultimately, studies of constitutional failure, especially those that stress the im-
portance of constitutional thinking and civic education, will not much matter if we think 
the Constitution is pretty much a success or unlikely to fail. In such cases, the Constitution 
already has all that it needs—citizens who love it from afar. We hardly need add that such 
a Constitution has no need of a national university or a civic education that will help to 
create citizens with a mind to care for the Constitution in any meaningful way.  
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